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PÁLMA FARKAS 
THE NORTH AMERICAN VISIONS ON MIGUEL PRIMO DE 
RIVERA'S DICTATORSHIP 
In a former study I showed how the North American press saw the events 
evolving in Spain between September 1923 and March 1930, namely, during 
Miguel Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship. 
At that time, within the framework of the North American press, I 
concentrated on the daily news and I prepared a study based upon the articles of 
The New York Times, which proved that daily news being a news service does 
not (or should not) transmit opinion, and the newspaper mentioned above did 
meet this condition. It is also true, however, that based on the evidence of its 
articles the reader could have the impression that The New York Times did not 
turn against the dictator, what is more, the paper presented his regime as if it 
had accepted the dictator(ship) quietly or even supported it a little.1 
In the present essay, I would like to present the writings of the North 
American press that do form an opinion and give an analysis about the events 
in Spain between 1923 and 1930. I will not focus on the articles of daily 
papers, but on the ones of weekly and/or fortnight’s magazines.  
For this paper the articles selected were the ones I had found and gathered 
during my field trip in Florida, USA in 2002 and 2003. 
The magazines to be presented in this essay – in sequence of appearance –
are the following: The New Republic, The Outlook, and The Nation.  
The available press material is far more abundant than the space allowed in 
this volume of studies, therefore I tried my best to line up the most illustrative 
articles so that we could get an accurate picture of the American journalists’ 
opinion formed about the events unfolding in Spain as well as about their 
main characters. 
The New Republic reveals even in its subtitle that it is a A Journal of 
Opinion. Nonetheless, we cannot only read evaluation in its articles, the 
magazine does publish numerous informative writings as well. 
Whilst studying the articles, I found several among the magazines; one of 
the most striking was perhaps – as we are going to see in the articles quoted –, 
that each of the magazines listed above intended to compare both Primo de 
Rivera’s personality and dictatorial regime to those of the Italian Mussolini 
while looking for parallels or pronounced contrasts. 
                                                
1  Pálma FARKAS, “Primo de Rivera en la prensa norteamericana”, in: Acta 
Hispanica, Tomus VIII, Szeged, Hungary, 81-86.  
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On the grounds of the quotations presented here we shall see that there is 
no unambiguous answer to the question whether the two dictatorships indeed 
rest on analogous elements, if the two dictators’ personalities are really so 
similar (or identical?), because the more articles we read, the more opinions 
we shall encounter. Regarding this, the first article of The New Republic 
coming to light following Primo de Rivera’s takeover – in the absence of 
evidence – cannot take a stand on this question yet and, therefore, articulates 
its views very carefully: 
“It is too early to say that the Spanish revolution is a repetition of the 
Fascist coup in Italy. Though time may show that General Rivera […] is 
another Mussolini […]”2  
The article itself is rather concise, and – after showing in telegraphese the 
Spanish situation – it ends with a slightly cynical note and tries to compare 
Primo to Mussolini: “Like Mussolini, he will now discover that the strong, 
stern man on horseback only begins his troubles when he comes down off his 
horse and goes to work.”3 
The wars in Morocco are tightly linked to Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship – 
the North American press does not avoid giving analysis or expressing its 
opinion. Unfortunately, due to the narrow scope of this study, I do not have 
much possibility to illustrate this in a very detailed way; I would rather 
present the articles containing opinions related to the dictatorship itself. 
However, having read such articles, in general the American press cannot 
be said to have thought well of the Spanish military actions at all, mostly 
because of the financial costs involved and human losses suffered in the war.  
Perhaps, the following extract of an article can be a good proof of this: 
“His economy campaign […] is to begin in the place most embarrassing to 
a dictator: the army, which is so overrun by needless commanders, it costs 
twice as much to maintain the officers as the troops. The chief point in the 
Rivera policy is to get as many Moroccans murdered as possible, and in the 
shortest time possible.”4 
In the magazine Primo de Rivera’s personality meets with strong criticism 
and the reason for this is the way he treated Unamuno who is contemplated as 
“one of Spain’s leading literary men” by the American press, while the 
furious author of the article, besides expressing his views of Primo’s 
intellectual abilities, simply names the dictator a “swashbuckler”: 
“Miguel de Unamuno, is one of Spain’s leading literary men, a liberal, but 
by no means revolutionary […] He was so presumptuous as to criticize 
General Rivera in print. That swashbuckler, knowing himself unable to 
                                                
2 The New Republic, A Journal of Opinion, 26 September 1923, VOL. XXXVI, No. 
460, 111. 
3 Idem. 
4 Ibidem, 3 October 1923. No. 461, 139. 
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compete with Unamuno in a contest of brains, has replied by deporting him to 
the Canary Islands…” 5 
The author’s opinion about (the) dictator(s) can be clearly understood from 
the following lines: 
“When you have the dictator’s sort of mind, the only argument you can 
understand is your own: brute force.”6 
As I have already mentioned, the American press is indeed interested in 
the events in Morocco, and often publishes lengthy, mainly reporting, 
sometimes analyzing articles dealing with such topics, therefore a regular 
reader can get continuously informed about the latest developments. 
Journalists face a hard task during wartime and dictatorships, especially if 
we think about censorship. 
The author of an article expresses his opinion and, at the same time, 
demonstrates the gravity of the Moroccan events: 
“The recent news about events in Morocco is so serious that it scarcely 
matters whether it is true or not. If it is false, it is one of the fabrications by 
which politicians make history. If it is true, it can be no worse than that.”7 
The writer of the article is not optimistic as far as Spain’s situation in 
Morocco is concerned: 
“Her (=Spain, F.P.) internal situation is such that she cannot even hope by 
her own effort to maintain her present foothold on the cliffs above the 
Mediterranean.8 In any case, Spain cannot hold on to Morocco, even if Abd-
el-Krim were too weak to defeat her present strength […]”9  
On 17 March 1926, under the title “BANDWAGON”, several short 
statements are quoted by the magazine and one of them is related to Primo de 
Rivera. It contains – let us say – the first positive opinion so far: 
“Doesn’t scowl at all: 
Primo de Rivera, to me, is one of the most remarkable characters in 
history. He is not what we would generally picture as a dictator, because he is 
always smiling… 
The ex-Ambassador to Spain.”10 
                                                
5 The New Republic, 23 April 1924. VOL. XXXVIII. No. 490 
6 Idem. 
7 John LANGDON-DAVIES, “The Riddle of Morocco. What are the French doing in 
North Africa?”, in: The New Republic, 20 May 1925. VOL.XLII, 335. 
8 Idem. 
9 Ibidem, 336. 
10 “The Bandwagon” in: The New Republic, 17 March 1926. VOL. XLVI.No. 589, 104. 
During Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship three American ambassadors served in Spain: 
Alexander Moore from March 1923 to December 1925, he was succeeded by Ogden 
H. Hammond until October 1926. Between 1929 and 1933 Irwin B. Laughlin was the 
Ambassador of the United States delegated to Spain. 
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Primo de Rivera’s relationship to the university students, too, was full of 
fierce discords; the American press covers this in a fairly long article11 and 
criticizes the activity of Primo’s government in this situation: 
“In its present struggle with university students throughout Spain, the 
government has been equally blundering.”12 
Primo – under the pretext of “reorganization” – closes universities, 
precisely five out of eleven  – as we get to know from the article; and the 
author of the article adds: 
“Primo de Rivera has announced that, if necessary, he will close all of the 
universities.”13 
Carleton Beals sadly translates the meaning of the word “reorganization” 
for his readers: 
“reorganization means that special crown committees take over the 
administration, expel refractory students, eliminate all doubtful professors, 
and abolish academic freedom entirely. In short, students are being deprived 
of any chance to receive a higher education.”14  
The article discloses data and facts on Spanish education as well as the rate 
of illiteracy, then bitterly notes that 
“[…] a Spanish child in Madrid who depends on the public schools for an 
education is worse off than most Negro children in the United States. The 
average illiteracy in Madrid […] is about the same as that for Negroes in 
America.”15 
The journalist adds, however, that “this lack of education […] cannot be 
blamed entirely upon the dictatorship”16 
Nevertheless, his opinion about the Spanish is rather negative: 
“But it helps to explain the existence of a government as blind and 
backward as Primo de Rivera’s in Spain, which once led the world in prowess 
and culture. An ignorant government is the product of an ignorant nation.”17  
In the hour of Primo de Rivera’s resignation in January 1930, the author of 
the article starts to deliberate on Spain’s future, but leaves the question open: 
“It remains to be seen, […] whether General de Rivera is as completely 
out of power as the newspaper correspondents suggest, and also whether, as 
                                                
11 Carleton BEALS, “The Spanish Students Fight On”, in: The New Republic, 12 June 
1929. VOL.LIX, No.758, 93. 
12 Idem. 
13 Ibidem, 94. 
14 Idem. 




is promised, General Berenguer’s regime will be but one step […] on the 
road back to constitutional government.”18 
In the article the writer makes space for his – not in the least positive – 
views on the Spanish King, according to which “King Alfonso is an old 
fashioned king […], an autocrat, a man of the world, with nothing democratic 
or limited about his monarchy.”19 
Then again we can read Primo’s name right beside Mussolini’s, 
nevertheless, this time we shall find no parallels. On the contrary: 
“Primo has neither the bad nor the good points of Mussolini. Under his 
rule there was probably less violence than under previous Spanish 
governments.”20  
The author of the article sees differences not only in the two dictators’ 
personalities and regimes, but also regarding the people’s attitude towards the 
dictators: “The attitude of Spain to its dictator has been precisely the opposite 
of that of Italy to hers. It has been hard to find anyone enthusiastic about him, 
and most people were openly hostile.”21  
The article includes information on the Moroccan problem, the Catalan 
and Basque situation, too, but the writer finds an even more fundamental 
problem, that is, the one of the modernization of the country, and is pondering 
upon “how to get Spain, the last great medieval country, to consent to be 
modernized”22. 
Regarding this question, however, the writer acknowledges some 
successes of the dictorship: 
“Here the dictatorship has put up quite an imposing facade of 
achievement. There have been plans […] for stimulating production, for 
developing the use of raw materials, for road-making and railway 
construction, while the exhibitions in Seville and Barcelona have been good 
advertisements in their way. ’Tourism’ may well become a more important 
industry than heretofore.  
[…] doubtless, there is scarcely any other country with claims to 
civilization where schemes for irrigation, railways, roads, industry […] would 
take as long to mature as in Spain; but […] Primo de Rivera can claim that at 
least he has tried to do these things and that the attempts have been a 
valuable piece of national education.”23  
                                                
18  John LANGDON-DAVIES, “The Future in Spain”, in: The New Republic, 12 
February 1930.VOL.LXI. No. 793, 322. 
19 Idem. 





At the end of the article we can read the author’s harsh opinion of the 
government and the role of the Church, which is the following: 
“[…] Spain is, and has always been, a theocracy. The form of government 
is of little importance […]. Spain regards herself as the only surviving 
fragment of the theocratic world-state of the middle ages; indeed, the middle 
ages are regarded as a golden age to be looked back upon with regret.”24  
Keeping to the title of the article, however, the writer does provide us with 
a sort of answer concerning the “Future in Spain”: 
“It would probably have been to the ultimate advantage of the Spanish 
people if Primo de Rivera had remained in power.”25 
Regarding Primo’s successor, he thinks poorly of General Berenguer when 
he says:  
“His real successor is likely to be either the mouthpiece of a new military 
clique or a survivor from the unsatisfactory political groups which preceded 
him. He should have fallen, not at the hands of the parties of yesterday, but at 
the hands of the parties of tomorrow. What are these parties? That they will 
be republican seems more than probable. There will be no alternative […]”26  
The title of the first article of The Outlook almost predestines its content: 
“A Spanish Mussolini”. 
The reader may think the article of more than two pages will give us a 
picture on the presumed similarities between Primo de Rivera and Mussolini 
but, instead, the author of the article – as an introduction – tells us about 
Primo’s military education as well as his merits. Then he briefly presents the 
problems till he reaches the dawn of 13 September 1923. Only when the 
journalist has finished relating the circumstances of Primo de Rivera’s 
takeover, does he start to wonder which (political) group(s) or parties will 
Primo probably win: 
“Spanish issues and parties are somewhat tangled. How about the 
separatists? Will Rivera succeed with them? Hardly. One of his first acts was 
to decree severe penalties on persons found engaged in republican or other 
separatist propaganda. […] How about the Socialists? Will Don Primo de 
Rivera win them? Hardly, for he has seized the headquarters of the 
extremists – the Communists and Anarchists. […] But he has good chance to 
win conservative Socialists, for, as he says, he also proposes to go a long way 
in the direction of “wide freedom of organization, distinguishing between 
fair-trade unionism and dishonest communism […].”27  
                                                
24 Idem. 
25 Ibidem, 324. 
26 Idem. 
27 Elbert Francis BALDWIN, “A Spanish Mussolini”, in: The Outlook, 10 October 1923. 
VOL.135. No.6, 215. 
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Then the writer asks the same question regarding Primo’s military success, 
and seems to find the answer himself:  
“How about the soldiers? […] Rivera faces the discontent among the 
military juntas, or officers’ unions, ignored by him, as well as among those 
generals not included in the Directory. Moreover, his views as to spending 
more money on an unprofitable Moroccan colony, with its precarious 
foothold, have not made him particularly popular with the “forward 
party” […] He can rely on the loyalty of much, if not most, of the army; if he 
could rely on the loyalty of it all, he would indeed be master of the 
situation.”28 
Last but not least the writer wonders about the Spanish people’s opinion 
and whether Primo will be popular with them: 
“How about the people as a whole? Many of their representatives will 
refuse to recognize the new authority. But, in general, the people will be glad 
of a change towards economy and efficiency, no matter how undemocratic the 
change.29 
The author’s opinion is that “inevitably one thinks of the parallel between 
Spain and Italy”30, and compares the two dictator(ship)s: 
As for similarities, the writer highlights that “the movement in neither 
country is apparently directed against the monarch”.31  Then he adds: “A 
paralell exists, but it is not so close as it might be” 32  and he lists the 
differences: 
1. “The Spanish character differs from the Italian. […] The Italians 
outdistance the Spaniards in youthful exuberance and enthusiasm, and 
they have thus known how to carry Fascism to success with a rush. 
Mussolini’s revolt was accentuated by lively demonstrations and 
processions […]. The Spaniard is[…]far soberer; in comparison with 
the Italians his is a political apathy. 
2. The background of Roman history was successfully drawn on to furnish 
the impressive outline of the Fascist organization. 
3. Mussolini had for years carefully built up the Fascist forces, so that 
when the day came to march on Rome he could offer to Italy and the 
world an unparalelled spectacle. 
4. He had imposed himself so graphically on the popular fancy that it 
became simply obsessed by his personality.”33  






33 Ibidem, 215-216. 
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According to the author of the article, “Rivera lacks these advantages. […] 
and yet, […] it is not impossible that the Spanish Mussolini’s triumph may 
even outrank that of the Italian. We shall see.”34  
In the article published on 28 August 1928 we can also read an evaluation 
of Primo de Rivera, which is at the same time another comparison with the 
Italian dictator, and this time – again – the author of the article seems to have 
found differences rather than analogy:  
“de Rivera has failed where Mussolini has succeeded – in commanding 
support, discouraging rebellion, and shaping the Government to dictatorial 
ends. After six years in power he can point with pride to few of his […] policies. 
The budget […] is lopsided, foreign trade is still unsatisfctory, and the 
Government leans heavily on the loans of English and American bankers.”35  
Nevertheless, he finds one positive fact concerning Primo’s virtues – 
though apparently with mixed emotions. This merit of Primo’s is related to 
suppressing illiteracy, and the author’s view is (in contrast to many other 
journalists) that “the illiteracy rate is being steadily reduced. The premier 
may regard that as a promising sign. His enemies may, too.”36 
The series of articles of The Outlook about Primo de Rivera is finished by 
an article – written and published following his death – which stands fully by 
the dictator, lists his merits, and – as the author of the article spent one year 
living in Spain – changes its own former opinion regarding both the whole 
country and the nation in a positive way. 
The writer tells us about a sort of wall that, on the one hand, turns out to be 
symbolic – we shall see how –, and, on the other hand, it may as well mean 
the walls surrounding the “patio”, or the two together… The journalist thinks 
that “the walls of Spain […] have held back progress and held in 
medievalism, both made and unmade the late dictator, Primo de Rivera, 
halted in mid-career the greatest forward impulse in Spain’s history […] The 
walls and the patios of Spain then may be taken as a symbol of the baffling 
character and inner life of the Spanish people. Centuries of intense seclusion 
and exclusion have inbred a sensitive self-sufficiency and over-developed 
individualism that abhors outside contacts of whatsoever character. 
Each patio unit is organic and quite content with and within itself.”37 In 
his opinion, “the ultimate defeat of Primo de Rivera may be laid at the door 
of this national characteristic.”38  
                                                
34 Idem. 
35 “Spain’s dictatorship”, in: The Outlook, 28 August 1928., VOL. 152. No. 18, 695. 
36 Idem. 
37 Henry Albert PHILLIPS „Spain is not like that”, in: The Outlook and Independent, 
9 August 1930. VOL.154. No. 15, 568. 
38 Idem. 
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The author compares the Spanish and the Americans as individualistic 
characters, and comes to the conclusion that “the Spaniard is individualistic 
in a radically different manner from our inidvidualistic American. […] We 
are responsive children of organized effort; unimaginative agents of mass 
production and organization.”39 
The writer continues describing his views regarding the Spanish 
individualism and the people’s indifference, and strongly criticizes the nation 
pointing out on the reason for the lack of progress or a successful uprising, he 
thinks that “this individual and collective indifference to the common cause is 
the besetting sign of Spain where progress is concerned; and its negative 
virtue lies in their failure to be diverted or to ’get together’ in sufficient 
numbers to support a revolution.”40  
The writer then mentions a feature of the Spanish which can also be taken 
as criticism and which can be read in other journalists’s articles too: 
“[…] the people are forever gazing backward toward a brilliant past of 
the day before yesterday, instead of reasoning and working toward an even 
fairer tomorrow.”41 
In what follows the writer assumes that “this national trait is not confined 
to their relations with foreigners” and the Spanish people’s “indifference at 
the Queen-Mother’s funeral and then in the presence of King Alfonso” draws 
the journalist’s attention – as he puts it: 
“Their indifference at the funeral of the Queen mother – whom they are 
supposed to have loved beyond any one else in Spain – was almost 
ludicruous. Their indifference in the presence of King Alfonso was only a 
shade less so.”42 Then after having written some cynical words about the 
Spaniards he notices that “they are by no means a criminal people, for I never 
saw a public act of violence during my year in Spain”43 but then again adds 
ironically that “although they will deliberately disobey the Americanized 
traffic regulations and argue with a policeman.”44  
Before listing Primo’s merits, the author expresses his bitter opinion 
according to which “such a race is incapable of a headlong or simultaneous 
revolution, and is reasonably safe for despotism or dictatorship. The walls of 
tradition and indifference and their deep-rooted individualism made progress 
or well-organized effort well-nigh impossible. For centuries, while decaying, 
Spain glorified in this stagnant self-hypnotism.”45 
                                                
39 Idem. 







From this point onwards the author starts to describe Primo de Rivera 
whom he considers “a man of energy and force”46 and whom he respects a 
lot, and extols Primo de Rivera’s virtues in the following way: 
“In July, 1923, when Spain seemed about to topple over into the abyss of 
its own hollow visions, a truly great Spaniard, a man of energy and force, of 
imagination as well as vision to carry it out, and a product of French military 
efficiency – one Don Miguel, Marquess de Estella, then governor of 
Barcelona, rose up and seized the nation […] He set about what has now 
proved an almost hopeless task, of transforming […] vanity of a race of 
individuals in their past into a progressive and united nation intent to its 
future.”47 
As for people’s acceptance of the Spanish dictator the writer thinks that 
“there seemed little doubt that de Rivera was their acknowledged national 
leader; but obviously they did not hail him as their national hero as well.”48 
Phillips is also among the journalists who will not avoid mentioning the 
names of Primo de Rivera and Mussolini on the same page: 
“Rivera had none of the Mussolini bearing or overbearing; rather he was 
almost gracious in his manner.”49  
Regarding Primo’s takeover and “lust for power” the writer sides with the 
Spanish dictator and states: 
“It is a mistaken idea to suppose that General Primo de Rivera seized the 
Spanish government in a mere lust for power. Rivera was primarily a 
reformer, a modern Cervantes, whose single touch of romance was a dream 
to put Spain back on the map of Europe by modern means.”50 
The writer praises Primo’s work and his actions planned for the sake of the 
nation as follows: 
“His desire was to save his native land from […] bankruptcy and 
disintegration and put her on a sound business footing. To break down the 
walls of the Moorish and medieval patios that began at the Pyrenees!”51 
The journalist points out three problems in which – according to his 
opinion – Primo de Rivera held his ground: 
1. Morocco. As for this question the writer’s view is brief:  
“[…] at a terrible cost perhaps, de Rivera settled the Moroccan-Rif 
question”52 









2. The problem of the separatist movement. 
“Catalonia was on the verge of revolution and secession…Rivera not 
only put them down but turned the warped energies of all in the 
direction of a united Spain.”53 
3. Graft. 
The journalist will not leave the problem of the army untouched either 
and assumes that “the Army was perpetually plotting against him, 
because they felt that he had betrayed them by cutting out the 
opportunity for further Army graft […]”54  
He believes that “Dictator de Rivera was mistakenly likened to 
Mussolini”55 and we can read that he thinks “the two men and their methods 
were diametrically opposite. De Rivera was a lonely pine, with everything and 
everybody […] against him. He had little of the personal magnetism and 
inspirational qualities that have played so large a part in Mussolini’s success.  
He made no attempt to rouse the ancient spirit and pride of his people 
through their imagination, knowing his people’s failings in this direction too 
well and that it would be fatal to progress.”56  
About the Spanish nation he states with noble simplicity that “there is 
little doubt but that Spain admired de Rivera and the more intelligent 
grievously miss him today”.57 
Regarding the relation between Primo de Rivera and the Church, the author 
has the impression that “the Church distrusted de Rivera, the nobles envied him 
and forced the King to go record officially as his enemy”58, “although – he 
adds – I am of the opinion that privately the King thanked him […] for all he 
had done for Spain and personally dreaded to have him resign”59.  
As far as the fights of political powers are concerned, about which the 
writer believes that “the Dictator had put down and held down so 
effectually”, he makes the following notes: 
“Now, with Rivera dead, these factions are unleashed to tear each other to 
pieces. The Communists and the Separatists, the Socialists and the Anarchists, 
the Monarchists and the Militarists, whom the dictator had put down and held 
down so effectually, are slowly rising and recreating the old chaos.”60 
As far as Primo’s failure, the journalist declares:  








60 Ibidem, 570.; 598 
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“Primo de Rivera did not fail; rather, Spain failed him”61  
He does not have in the least a high opinion of Primo’s successor, the 
Berenguer government: 
“The newly established government of General D’Amaso Berenguer has 
little more significance than a political emergency or breathing spell.”62 
The third magazine I have surveyed is The Nation.  
In the first article published only a fortnight after Primo’s takeover, the 
writer does not spare the Spanish government when expresses his views: 
“[…] the government of Spain is the most autocratic in Europe, if we are 
willing to except the temporary dictatorships in Russia and Italy”63  
Nevertheless, he does not have a poor opinion of the Spanish: 
“The Spaniard as an individual is the most democratic of persons […]”64 
The writer does not portray the King as the best monarch in the world, on 
the contrary: 
“In twentieth-century Spain the King still rules by divine right […]. 
Buttressed by grandees, life senators, army officers, and high ecclesiastics, 
Alfonso is nevertheless a prisoner of the political system. Without their 
support he would lose his job and without his support they would lose their 
privileges. […] It is the general belief outside Spain that Alfonso is a popular 
king. That is not true; he fears for his life like the former Czar of Russia […] 
his position is extremely insecure…”65  
As for the Moroccan news he states that “[…] reports about Spanish 
military operations in Morocco […] mean little or nothing to us. The Spanish 
papers headline the Moroccan war news which is so heavily censored that it 
takes several days for the truth to leak out. As soon as the public realizes one 
reverse, another has taken place.”66 
In april 1924, an article of indignant tone came out narrating Unamuno’s 
exile and the writer of the article – which is actually an appeal as well –
condemns Primo’s behaviour towards Unamuno.  
At the end of the article the journalist asks everyone to help the broken 
literary man: 
“Professor Unamuno was a poor man and as the Government refused to 
pay the price of his ticket to the Canaries, he is now in a very precarious 
position. I would suggest that The Nation undertake to administer such funds 
                                                
61 Ibidem, 598 
62 Idem. 
63 Samuel M. WAXMAN, “The Revolt in Spain”, in: The Nation, 26 September 
1923. VOL.117. No.3038, 322. 
64 Idem. 
65 Idem. 
66 Ibidem, 323. 
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as we may be able to collect for Unamuno. A few dollars go a long way when 
translated into pesetas.”67 
In 1929, an article analyzing the first five years of Primo’s dictatorship is 
published. Remembering the circumstances of 1923, the author of the article 
gives a positive evaluation on the general’s achievements: 
“The five and a half years since then have […] demonstrated that the great 
Primo de Rivera was safe. He has ruled the country with the forms of 
absolutism, yet with the tacit backing of two estates – nobility and clergy – 
and without any real popularity. […] The five and a half years have witnessed 
significant advances in the governance of Spain.”68  
Then the journalist lists all the fields where the above mentioned 
“significant advances”69 have taken place: “sanitation […], railroads and 
other industries of the country […], an absurdly large army of government 
employees has been reduded […], as in the civil service, so in the army and 
navy Primo de Rivera has made astonishing reforms, […], foreign trade has 
been encouraged. […] In respect to foreign affairs, the dictatorship has 
consolidated the position of Spain in a satisfactory way[…].”70 
As soon as the author gets to the end of the list he points out to the things 
that – as he puts it – Primo’s regime “has not done” 71: 
“it has not produced an Utopian condition of universal education – 
literacy is as ever calculated at an appalingly low figure. It has not made any 
appreciable effort to develop agricultural reforms. And the most important of 
all […], it has not developed any party or organization to maintain and 
perpetuate the regime established in 1923.”72 
The author views the King and the dictator’s relation as an involuntary 
symbiosis and he thinks that “the King and the Jefe have […] been mutually 
suspicious of each other, principally because neither could last […] without 
the other.”73  
The writer finishes the article with the thought of overthrowing the 
dictatorship and his opinion is that 
“if the dictatorship is overthrown and replaced by a liberal government, 
the chaos of 1923 will probably return.  
                                                
67  Hendrik Willem VAN LOON, “For Unamuno”, in: The Nation, 16 April 
1924.VOL. 118. No.3067, 429. 
68  William H. HESSLER, “The crisis in Spain”, in: The Nation, 29 May 1929. 





73 Ibidem, 658. 
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If the present Government is permitted to set up its own “constitutional 
regime”, then a dictatorship will continue, more efficient than 
parlamentarism, yet hardly tending in the direction of a better life for Spain’s 
toiling millions.”74 
This evaluation of a quite peaceful tone is followed by sharp criticism: 
“Primo, with his absurd concessions, iron-clad national monopolies to 
benefit favorites of the regime, represents neither a laissez-faire policy nor a 
theory of social control, but purely a medieval economy. Primo de Rivera is 
an anachronism because Spain is an anachronism. His opera-bouffe 
enterprise in one result of Spanish stubbornness to relinquish feudal glories; 
of the failure to create a public school system; of the national exhaustion and 
political corruption which today are Spain’s chief heritages from her once 
vast colonial empire. Indeed, Primo represents a final vain effort to shout out 
the modern world of Spain. […] Primo de Rivera[…]is the culmination of 
Spain’s colonial disasters. Primo is a direct product of the costly Moroccan 
stupidity”75 
As a summary, we may say that the American press pays attention to the 
European events, and – especially in the present case – to those of Spain. 
Each of the magazines mentioned in this study can be admitted to have 
published detailed accounts and analysis within one or two weeks after Primo 
de Rivera’s takeover on 13 September 1923; some writings in mild tones, 
others in stronger ones – expressing both positive and negative opinions. 
There is one more common characteristic in these magazines: none of 
them intended to avoid comparing Primo de Rivera’s regime and personality 
to those of Mussolini. We can perhaps find a sort of divergence among the 
articles, since there is no united stand on the judgement, and almost the same 
number of journalists believe that Primo de Rivera is indeed a new/another 
Mussolini as those who are averse to accepting this possibility by saying there 
is nothing common in the two dictators. 
The weak points of the Spanish regime attract the attention of the 
magazines; and the articles relate the same problems. The writings do not only 
state opinions, but, at the same time, they do report, and provide us with 
background information as well. Therefore, we can say that the North 
American reader could get a rich and colourful picture of the contemporary 
Spain of the time.  
As for the Moroccan events, the opinion is unified: none of the magazines 
agrees with the campaigns, and their reasonings are the same: Spain is not 
able to keep her colonies, she is not as strong power as she used to be; the war 
                                                
74 Idem. 
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only deepens the country’s problems as it consumes dreadful sums of money, 
and the human loss is also striking. All these together only raise discontent. 
There is, however, no firm agreement on Primo’s personality, military 
successes and/or failures; we can read examples of both extremely 
condemning views and strongly supporting ones as well. 
Nonetheless, there seem to be more articles thinking highly of Primo de 
Rivera’s achievements, acknowledging the dictator’s intentions of 
modernization. Without doubt, the interpretation – according to which Primo 
de Rivera’s regime was a dicatorship of modernization – is acceptable. 
